How Might Learning through an Educational Interpreter Influence Cognitive Development?
Brenda Schick
Put simply, educating children with the use of an interpreter is an educational experiment. Although published demographic data documents the number of children who are being educated in classrooms with educational interpreters (Kluwin, Moore, and Gaustad 1992), no studies have been done to document how well these students are doing. For all children, deaf or hard of hearing and hearing, the goal of education is not just to attain and recall factual information. The true goal of education is to develop cognitive skills that will serve as the foundation for later learning and participation in society.
The development of our cognitive systems begins at birth and continues throughout adulthood. As a general concept, cognition can be described as the various forms of knowing: perceiving, remembering, imagining, conceiving, judging, and reasoning (Flavell, Miller, and Miller 2002; Goswami 2002; Kuhn 1988). Cognitive development involves maturation in many domains such as being able to think more abstractly and from multiple perspectives, to integrate knowledge about the world and abstract thought, to solve problems, to imagine, and to empathize.
As children and adults learn, they are organizing and reorganizing their cognitive system. They are learning how to logically reason about the world and people, for example, learning how one’s thoughts and beliefs may differ from the thoughts and beliefs of those around them. They develop theories about many domains; for example, related to physics, they learn how things fall, how solids work, and how to figure the velocity and trajectory of flying balls. Many researchers view children as little scientists in that children are accumulating evidence about how the world works and how people interact and are using this evidence to construct theories, much like a scientist would do (Gopnik, Meltzoff, and Kuhl 1999). As children observe patterns of evidence, they formulate theories, and they test those theories on new evidence. If the new observation does not fit their theory, they modify the theory.
As children grow older, they become more adept as problem solvers. Older children view themselves as active, constructive agents, capable of selecting and transforming information (Kuhn 1989, 2000). Throughout the school years, children develop metacognitive skills as they gain a better understanding of the process of thinking and factors that influence it. They are more capable of cognitive self-regulation, the process of continuously monitoring progress toward a goal, checking outcomes, and redirecting unsuccessful efforts, which is a strong predictor of academic success (Joyner and Kurtz-Costes 1997; Zimmerman and Risemberg 1997). They become better able to recognize when they have not understood a message and to identify the source of their misunderstanding (Markman 1977, 1979).
Schools and classrooms provide a rich source of information to children so they can develop these theories and cognitive organizations. Basically, schools are complex social systems that surround children with interaction and modeling that are essential to cognitive development. Both adults and children use the social interaction that occurs among humans and the contexts of the interactions as raw material for cognitive development.
Within theories of education, many educators advocate a Vygotskian-inspired philosophy in which the child is not an independent discoverer of knowledge and theories (Kozulin 2003; Wertsch 1985a). A Vygotskian framework to education promotes assisted discovery in which both teachers and peers can guide a child’s learning with explanations, demonstrations, and verbal prompts (Rogoff 1998; Vygotsky 1978; Wertsch and Tulviste 1992). The child’s interactions with other individuals, both adults and children who are important to him or her, are central to the child’s cognitive development. As stated by Vygotsky (1978), “Each function in the child’s cultural development appears twice: first, on the social level, and later, on the individual level; first between people (interpsychological), and then inside the child (intrapsychological)” (57). Often, this philosophy of cognitive development is termed a sociocultural model because cognitive development occurs in the context of social discourse.
Participation in interactions with others is not the only factor that leads a child to construct knowledge and theories of how people and things operate. Language also plays a critical role in this framework (Bruner 1990; Nelson 1996; Wertsch 1985b). According to Nelson (1996), language serves the functions of medium, mediator, and tool of thought, which are all different. First, language is the medium of social interaction. It is the means by which humans interact with one another. It is also a medium of thought, carried out in terms of inner speech. Second, as a mediator, language provides us with categories, relationships, and genres that serve to organize our thinking. Third, as a tool, language is used to manipulate thought, reasoning, and knowledge systems.
Given this framework, cognitive development is the product of sociocultural interaction, mediated by language, in which language becomes a tool to shape and manipulate our thoughts. Deaf and hard of hearing children are capable of the same cognitive development as their typically developing peers. Although research shows that some deaf and hard of hearing children with hearing parents are delayed in aspects of abstract cognitive skills (de Villiers et al. 2000; Peterson and Siegal 1999a; Schick et al. 2000), this delay is because of delayed language skills and lack of access to fluent conversations, both of which occur for various reasons. Deaf and hard of hearing children who are acquiring sign language as an early first language from deaf parents who are fluent in signing exhibit cognitive development paralleling that of hearing children (Marschark 1993).
Cognitive development may be affected in deaf and hard of hearing children who access classroom interaction with hearing students and teachers by means of an interpreter. As Ramsey (1997) showed, providing a child with an interpreter does not provide him or her full access to the classroom. Ramsey followed three eight-year-old deaf children as they spent part of their educational day in a hearing classroom and part in a self-contained classroom with other children who were deaf and hard of hearing. Results of Ramsey’s ethnographic study demonstrated that the deaf students were not genuine participants in the hearing classroom and that they seemed much less engaged in the hearing classroom than in the classroom where all the children and the teacher were deaf or hard of hearing. Their interactions with their hearing teacher and hearing peers seemed impoverished. In particular, their hearing peers were unable to sign much more than a few rudimentary signs. The hearing teacher reported that, because the children used an interpreter, an awkwardness affected interacting with the deaf children; she had to “make a concentrated effort” (Ramsey 1997, 59) to have the deaf children answer questions. The teacher felt disconnected from the children because their eye gaze and other behaviors indicated that they were engaged with the interpreter. Even though the teacher understood that the interpreter was simply translating her message, she acknowledged that she often interpreted the children’s behavior to mean that they were not engaged in the class.
But probably just as important, some of the hearing children seemed to believe that their role was to help and discipline the deaf children, as if they were not in a peer-to-peer relationship but were apprentices of the teacher. Deaf students’ interactions with their hearing peers appeared to be directly related to the context of the lessons or behavior expected in class. In short, the few hearing classmates who interacted with their deaf peers mostly just told them what they were doing wrong. In contrast, the deaf students’ interactions with their deaf and hard of hearing peers within their self-contained classroom during part of the day included complex discussions about abstract thoughts, arguments and negotiations, and metalinguistic discussions. The deaf and hard of hearing children indicated that they did not identify with their hearing classmates; they were not friends with them.
In general, Ramsey’s (1997) study shows that difficulties are inherent in providing an interpreted education, even with the best of intentions. Given these difficulties as well as the integral relationship among language, interaction with significant others in one’s environment, and cognitive development, the challenge to explore potential areas where the use of an interpreter may affect domains of cognitive development becomes worthwhile.
DEVELOPING A THEORY OF MIND: UNDERSTANDING THE PERSPECTIVE OF OTHERS
In recent years, a great deal of research has been done to find out how hearing children achieve major cognitive milestones that involve understanding how other people view the world. This research, and subsequent research conducted with children who are deaf and hard of hearing, has significant implications for learning within an interpreted setting.
As young children mature, they develop an understanding of themselves and other people as psychological beings who think, know, want, feel, and believe. They come to understand that what they think or believe may be different from what another person thinks and believes. They also learn that much of our behavior is motivated or caused by our knowledge and beliefs. These understandings form the basis of a Theory of Mind. The following story might best illustrate what is involved in Theory of Mind:
Simon and his father made a cake together. But Simon wanted to go play and eat the cake later. So he put the cake in the cupboard. Then Simon left to play. The father thought that the icing on the cake might melt in the cupboard so he moved it to the refrigerator. Then the father left to go shopping. Later Simon came home and he wanted to eat his cake. Where will Simon look for the cake?
You probably responded that Simon would look for the cake in the cupboard. He had put it there, and he did not know that his father had moved it. Your answer shows that you have a Theory of Mind. You can distinguish between what you know and the false belief, based on faulty information, that Simon has.
Children at approximately the age of three, however, will answer this question incorrectly. They typically respond that the boy will look for the cake in the refrigerator because that is where it is. At this age, children have difficulty distinguishing what they know from what others know. They are aware that people have thoughts, but they do not realize that people’s thoughts and beliefs can be different from their own.
Major changes happen in the child’s understanding of other people’s minds by approximately age four. At this age, children can distinguish what they know from what others know, and they can correctly predict that a person’s behavior is dependent on what he or she thinks or knows, even when that belief is false. At the age of about four to five years, a child can correctly predict that Simon would look in the cupboard because that is where he left the cake.
Developmental psychologists call this cognitive ability a Theory of Mind because it shows that these children have an integrated set of concepts underlying their understanding of the mind (Astington 1993). This cognitive functioning is much the same as the methodical theories that children develop in areas such as physics and biology. Children develop an understanding that allows them to predict another person’s behavior based on what they know about that person’s thoughts and beliefs—just like you predicted that the boy would look for his cake in the cupboard. Like a scientific theory, which allows us to predict actions and interactions in our world, a Theory of Mind allows us to interpret and predict other people’s actions by considering their thoughts, beliefs, desires, and emotions.
Research on Development in Deaf and Hard of Hearing Children
Research has shown that deaf and hard of hearing children who have hearing parents have significant delays in their understanding of a Theory of Mind (de Villiers et al. 2000; Peterson and Siegal 1999b; Rhys-Jones and Ellis 2000; Steeds, Rowe, and Dowker 1997). For example, a recent investigation of Theory of Mind skills in deaf children found that deaf children with deaf parents performed much like hearing children whereas the deaf children with hearing parents (both signing and oral) were significantly delayed in their understanding of a Theory of Mind (de Villiers et al. 2000; Schick et al. 2000). The study also revealed that the language skills in the deaf children were directly related to their Theory of Mind skills. However, what predicted Theory of Mind skills was not the children’s general language skills but, rather, their vocabulary skills and their specific ability to comprehend syntactic complements. That is, if a child can understand sentences such as “He thought his cake was in the cupboard,” then that child is more likely to understand and predict behavior premised on a false belief, like that of Simon in the story. Children who had more advanced language skills were far more likely to pass the Theory of Mind tasks.
What this finding means is that the language delays that are typically observed in children who are deaf and hard of hearing are causally related to delays in major aspects of cognitive development. Children who are not able to understand complex syntactic forms like complements have difficulty understanding how their own thoughts and beliefs may differ from those around them.
Accessing the Classroom by Means of an Interpreter May Affect the Child’s Development of a Theory of Mind
To express information critical to the development of a Theory of Mind, an interpreter needs to communicate (a) who is speaking, (b) the content of their message, (c) the register of their message, and (d) the communicative stance the speaker has. By receiving all of this information, not just the content, recipients build an understanding of the speaker’s beliefs and understandings. Children build this understanding for all of their peers in the classroom and for adults. For example, we know which of our friends and colleagues are prone to exaggeration, a positive attitude, insightful thinking, or a humanistic outlook. We use this knowledge when we are listening and the context of any message includes our understanding of that individual’s beliefs, emotions, and knowledge. For children who are still developing a Theory of Mind, if information with respect to speaker intention is missing or distorted, they may miss critical information to help build an understanding of how each mind and individual is different and how understanding someone’s beliefs can help us predict behaviors and opinions.
Preliminary evidence indicates that interpreters have difficulty expressing the speaker’s register and indicating who is speaking. In a sample of approximately 1,300 interpreters who have been evaluated using the Educational Interpreter Performance Assessment (EIPA) (Schick and Williams 2004), the ability to communicate prosodic aspects of the classroom discourse was difficult for all of the interpreters but particularly those interpreters who were evaluated for interpreting in the elementary school setting; this group scored significantly lower than those who were evaluated for a secondary setting, F (1, 1303) = 6.13, p = .027. The average prosody score was 2.8 for the elementary interpreters and 3.0 for the secondary interpreters. Ironically, elementary-aged deaf and hard of hearing children with hearing families, who are likely to be delayed in their Theory of Mind skills and who are still developing their understanding of how minds work, may have the least amount of information in the classroom interpretation to figure out register and identity of the speaker.
There are several areas where either the use of an interpreter or lack of skills on the part of the interpreter may affect the child’s understanding of concepts related to a Theory of Mind. One aspect of all communication is that the speaker’s intention may not be obvious from the form of a message. Often, a great deal of information about the speaker’s intention, or stance, is communicated through register shifts, discourse markers, and prosodic changes. For example, a teacher might issue a warning to finish seatwork by saying, “It’s getting close to reeeeceeesss,” meaning “you may not get to go out if you don’t finish.” If the speaker’s intention is obliterated because the interpreter failed to use the appropriate nonmanual devices, then the child could interpret this message literally as an indication that he or she should start looking forward to playing outside rather than as the true intention. The child who interprets this message literally but sees peers working harder could become confused by the resulting mixed message. Without a mature Theory of Mind, the child may not be able to realize this discrepancy, and without the linguistic clues in the interpreted message, the child may also lack the needed information to figure it out.
Another aspect where Theory of Mind may be related to the use of an interpreter is in the area of indicating shifts in who is speaking. The child may not be able to distinguish what information is coming from the teacher in relation to what the interpreter is signing. The concept that information is being processed by the interpreter but the teacher is the person who produces the message may be difficult to understand for young children, especially those with weak Theory of Mind skills. It is probable that young children with delayed language skills confuse these issues continuously. This possibility may be particularly likely because it is impossible for the child to maintain visual contact with both the interpreter and the teacher. In addition, many interpreters who work with young children may alter what the teacher actually says, which may further obliterate the chance to identify which part of the message is from the teacher and which part is from the interpreter. (This point is not meant to conclude that alteration is always incorrect.)
Finally, the possibility exists that interpreters do not fully include information that allows a deaf or hard of hearing child to learn about the personalities and beliefs of the hearing peers in a classroom, information that involves another aspect of Theory of Mind. We use what our peers say to learn about their personal tendencies, for example, whether a particular student tends to be humorous, off-topic, or insightful. When an interpreter does not fully represent who is speaking, the stance of the speaker, and other information often communicated through prosody, the incomplete representation will affect the deaf or hard of hearing child’s understanding of his hearing peers as individuals with unique personalities. In addition, not getting this information distances the deaf or hard of hearing child from the collective class culture and may further impede the deaf or hard of hearing child’s ability to develop close relationships with the children in the class. Children also use this information to generalize personality traits of friends, a process that is related to their own development of personality and self-esteem (Hartup 1996a, 1996b).
THE EFFECT OF AUTHENTIC PEER INTERACTION
The fact that childhood friendships are an important part of socioemotional development and social cognition is widely known (Buklowski, Newcomb, and Hartup 1996; Hartup 1996a; Ladd 1990). But increasing evidence indicates that peer interaction, particularly with children who are considered friends, is important to cognitive development, problem solving, and learning in general. For example, research has shown that children conduct more extensive exploration of a new task with a friend than with a nonfriend. Their conversation is more vigorous and mutually oriented. Similarly, children who engage in exploration with a friend are likely to recall more than if exploration is conducted with a nonfriend (Newcomb and Bagwell 1996). Other research shows that children who were engaged in problem solving with friends were more likely to negotiate (rather than simply assert power), to collaborate and elaborate, to offer more suggestions, and to check results—all of which lead not only to better problem-solving results but also to better problem-solving skills (Hartup 1996a, 1996b). When children engaged in collaborative writing with friends, they wrote narratives that were rated higher than when writing with nonfriends. Specifically, their narratives show more evidence of motivating conditions and of solutions, and the texts contain fewer errors.
Rogoff (1990) maintains that “children may be freer to examine the logic of arguments with peers rather than adults” (174). In fact, older children may express more logical arguments with their peers than with their mothers, and their discussions about moral reasoning with peers may have a greater effect on their thinking than discussions with their mothers (Kruger 1993; Kruger and Tomasello 1986). In problem-solving tasks, children who benefited the most from peer interaction were those children who more frequently shared ideas about the logic of the tasks, focusing on solutions and strategies for dealing with the problem rather than focusing on one another’s role or behavior. All of this research would indicate that engaging in collaborative and argumentative interactions that require verbal reasoning with peers can foster and support aspects of cognitive growth. However, cognitive growth involves more than simple engagement with peers. As Hartup (1996a, 1996b) notes, cognitive growth occurs, not simply because children interact with knowledgeable peers and adults; it also requires an emotional interdependency that constitutes “closeness” in relationships.
So evidence indicates that peer interaction, particularly with friends, enhances children’s problem-solving skills, exploration, and recall. However, peer interaction is an area that is highly likely to be affected by the presence of an adult interpreter. Evidence shows that children will reduce their interaction when adult observers are present (Brody, Stoneman, and Wheatley 1984; Rogoff 1990). Peers are more likely to share their thinking with one another than with an adult. This fact is in direct conflict with the fact that an adult is present during interpreted peer conversations. We should expect that a deaf or hard of hearing child’s interactions with peers may be less robust, engaging, and collaborative when an interpreter is present.
Evidence of this lack of quality interactions between deaf and hard of hearing elementary-aged children and their hearing classmates is found in the study by Ramsey (1997). She reported that the deaf and hard of hearing children’s interactions with their hearing peers were mostly superficial and often focused on behavior regulation, for example, what the deaf and hard of hearing child should be doing that he or she was not. Research (Newcomb and Bagwell 1996; Hartup 1996a, 1996b; Kruger 1993) shows that the more abstract discussions, negotiations, and opinion-sharing collaborations are what influence cognitive skills in hearing children. Precisely this type of interaction is what was missing in the deaf and hard of hearing children’s interactions with their hearing peers in Ramsey’s study.
Other researchers have reported that deaf and hard of hearing students who are mainstreamed (a) show strong preferences for interacting with classmates who are also deaf or hard of hearing rather than with their hearing peers and (b) have limited participation in both school and social activities (Foster 1988; Foster and Brown 1989; Greenberg and Kusche 1987; Stinson and Whitmire 1992). The limited quantity and quality in peer interactions between the deaf or hard of hearing student and his or her hearing peers would likely affect more than the child’s social development, perhaps also affecting the child’s ability to learn collaboratively, to explore problems through discussion, and to engage in complex verbal reasoning. For adults, the ability to socialize effectively is highly related to well-being (Reis, Collins, and Berscheid 2000).
THE EFFECT OF PEER-TO-PEER ARGUMENTATION AND CONFLICT
According to both Vygotskian and Piagetian theory, cognitive conflict is a positive event in that it can cause cognitive growth in the understanding of complex problems (Rogoff 1990). Piaget believed that, when children of equal status have different beliefs about a problem, the peer interaction can cause children to change their cognitive theories and beliefs. Arguments can be positive rather than negative from a cognitive perspective (Miller 1987). Arguments are basically discussions of divergent understanding in which participants have to resolve what is being talked about before they can proceed. At least three aspects of argumentation benefit children. First is the obvious cognitive growth involved in considering one’s own theory in relationship with a peer’s, which may result in either strengthening or changing an established theory. Second is a developmental progression involving how well children justify their viewpoints, what are valid points to make, and what is a convincing logical sequence of facts, all of which require both cognitive and linguistic skills. Third, true argumentation, by definition, requires perspective taking, an aspect of Theory of Mind. To argue persuasively, a child must consider the viewpoints of all participants to know what types of arguments would be persuasive.
However, research has focused on arguments between peers of relatively equal social status. Teachers and other adults bring an authority to arguments that can overwhelm a child’s sense of what is right or wrong. Probably as important, little evidence indicates that teachers engage children in arguments or even reasoned discussions. Kuhn (1991) notes that students are rarely asked either to develop reasoned arguments to justify a position or to coordinate arguments and counterarguments. She speculates that, most likely, argumentation is more prominent in the out-of-classroom lives of students (and adults). With peers, children can engage in true reasoned arguments about issues and concepts that are meaningful and current in their lives.
The likelihood is that hearing peers will avoid argumentation when an adult is present, in particular, when interacting with a deaf or hard of hearing peer by means of an educational interpreter. Adults give children the message that they should avoid arguments rather than help those children develop argumentation skills. Because of these factors, the deaf or hard of hearing child may experience very little or limited argumentation during development, especially because teachers rarely appear to use argumentation as a method of instruction. So deaf or hard of hearing children may miss argumentation in the classroom and on the playground; moreover, given the sign language skills of many hearing parents, they may also miss it at home. The child would not only miss the benefits to the development of cognition but also would most likely not develop the special discourse skills needed to successfully argue (Grimshaw 1990; Pieraut-Le Bonniec and Valette 1991).
LEARNING IN THE CLASSROOM: SCAFFOLDING AND APPRENTICESHIP
An important feature of how adults interact with children to support learning is the function of scaffolding (Bruner 1983; Wood 1989). When an individual scaffolds learning during interaction, he or she adjusts the assistance provided to fit the child’s current level of performance. As the child gains knowledge of the task or concept, the adult gradually, and often unconsciously, withdraws support, turning over more responsibility to the child. The most effective scaffolding occurs in the Zone of Proximal Development, a term coined by Vygotsky (1978), which refers to a range of tasks that the child cannot yet handle alone but can accomplish with the help of more skilled partners. Adults often break a task into more manageable units or concepts to scaffold a child’s learning. Even when adults are not directly teaching, they often guide participation in a cooperative dialogue (Rogoff 1990, 1998). To guide in this way, adults often adjust their language for a younger learner, but the adult selects activities and materials, the context of learning, and other arrangements of the learning environment. As Rogoff observes, guided participation occurs in all cultures; adults all over the world, in literate and preliterate societies, make arrangements for children’s learning and revise the children’s responsibilities as they gain skill and knowledge. Evidence shows that this fine-tuned support is related to advances in cognitive development.
However, children who are deaf or hard of hearing may not have language or cognitive skills at the same level as that of their hearing peers. Given this possibility, the Zone of Proximal Development for a deaf or hard of hearing child and that for a hearing child in the same classroom may be very different. What would be appropriate scaffolding and guided participation for a hearing child at any point in development may not scaffold the deaf or hard of hearing child’s learning. The deaf or hard of hearing child may need interaction and teaching that is more fine-tuned to his or her level of skills and understanding.
Yet teaching approaches basically assume that all the children in a classroom are within a reasonable range of developmental skills. Although this assumption is probably not valid even for the hearing children in the classroom, it is the foundation of our educational system. Given this context, some deaf or hard of hearing children are likely receiving scaffolding that is not well adjusted to their level of skills. Even if the educational team recognizes that the level of instruction is inappropriate for the deaf or hard of hearing child, the educational interpreter often does not have the training to modify the language and content to scaffold that particular child’s learning. Interestingly, many advocate that educational interpreters adopt a model of interpreting that was developed by interpreters who work in the adult community where the gold standard is to represent everything the teacher and classmates say. But from an education perspective, it might make more sense to train the interpreter so he or she is capable of working as a member of the educational team to determine and deliver the kinds of modifications that may help the child learn.
Ironically, some evidence shows that communication problems on the deaf or hard of hearing child’s part increase the teacher’s tendency to control the discourse even more. Wood (1989) found that, when a deaf and hard of hearing child failed to respond appropriately to a teacher’s question, the teacher assumed more control of the discourse, further inhibiting responses from the child. Wood describes this process as a spiral of increasing control that consequently inhibits responses from the child. For a child with an interpreter, a question or lesson that is not appropriately adjusted to that child’s level may serve to reduce his or her participation or increase feelings of inadequacy.
THE IMPLICATIONS WHEN THE INTERPRETED MESSAGE DOES NOT REFLECT THE CLASSROOM CONTENT
Although the expectation that the content of the classroom will be interpreted with 100 percent message equivalency is probably theoretically impossible, even with the most skillful interpreters, in most situations, that goal is certainly pursued. Although many interpreters within the larger pool have the skills to provide the highest possible access, many of the working educational interpreters omit and distort large amounts of the classroom discussion. Using the Educational Interpreter Performance Assessment (EIPA), Schick, Williams, and Bolster (2000) evaluated 59 educational interpreters who were currently working in the public schools and who either volunteered to be evaluated or were volunteered by their school district. They found that more than one-half of the interpreters were not able to meet the minimum standards established in the state of Colorado (3.5 on a 5.0 scale). Roughly speaking, a level 3 on the EIPA means that the interpreter is communicating approximately 65 percent to 70 percent of the information. Because specific skills are averaged over a range of skills, an interpreter scoring at a level 3.5 might score below this level in certain areas. In fact, Schick, Williams, and Bolster found that, as a group, the interpreters were significantly better in their sign vocabulary skills than in their grammatical skills or their overall ability to communicate the whole message. Data that Schick and Williams have collected from other states indicate that Colorado is not unique; educational interpreters in all states vary in terms of skills, and many cannot meet what many states consider to be a minimum skill level.
People often discuss the implications of the fact that some educational interpreters are not qualified in terms of how this fact affects the child’s learning. But in all probability, the child’s cognitive development is affected, too. Interpreters who produce a message that is missing parts of the original message are not typically making principled omissions. That is, many interpreters are not making decisions that will preserve the most important information for the lesson. In addition, information is not just missing; it is also distorted, confused, and sometimes just wrong. The result can be a message that is poorly structured, that is missing major discourse elements, and that contains skewed and distorted facts. This corrupted information then becomes the children’s raw material for organizing and developing their cognitive concepts and structures.
A few examples may illustrate this concept. In a lesson that was being interpreted, a teacher announced to the class, “Today, we are discussing mammals, not fish or insects.” However, the interpreter failed to indicate the phrasal boundary by using prosody to represent the “fish or insects” or to emphasize the word not prosodically. The interpreted message communicated something more like, “Today, we are discussing mammals not fish-insects.” For the hearing children, the teacher’s language helped them realize that mammals were but one form of animal life, emphasizing at least three categories: mammals, fish, insects. For the deaf or hard of hearing child, the message communicated that mammals are not fish-insects. The message still communicates the sense of two categories, mammals and something called “fish-insects,” but the emphasis is very different. In addition, the message creates confusion about what exactly are “fish-insects.” So the information the child now has received to establish a cognitive representation for the lesson is already very different.
Research shows that hearing children are slow to develop the skills needed to recognize when a message is not clear; even hearing 12-year-olds miss obvious inconsistencies (Markman 1977, 1979). So it is unlikely that many elementary-aged deaf or hard of hearing children will be able to recognize unintelligible or distorted concepts. In addition, the child has to use cognitive processing and resources to think about what those “fish-insects” are. Older children may have the metacognitive skills to decide that the interpreter made an error, but that ability also takes cognitive resources. Any time or cognitive resources a child spends thinking about the information that is wrong or confused is time that cannot be spent organizing and thinking about the topic.
The example clearly shows that errors in interpreting affect the child’s factual knowledge, and perhaps more important, they affect a child’s cognitive structures and processing. They may cause a child to organize a concept in a completely incorrect or inefficient way that directly reduces what we call learning. Then, all new information about the topic is organized using this incorrect or ineffective cognitive structure. Consequently, the child may directly translate interpreting “errors” into poorly organized and badly structured cognitive representations.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Even when an interpreter is highly skilled and has a good professional relationship with the regular classroom teacher, a deaf or hard of hearing child’s education by means of an interpreter is different. A student’s access to the classroom discourse and authentic peer interactions and friendships is highly relevant to the development of thinking skills. Access is not just about what the teacher says.
Many professionals have voiced concerns about the potential detrimental effect of these differences on a deaf or hard of hearing child’s social development and self-image. However, learning through an interpreted education also may affect a child’s cognitive development. A child’s development of a Theory of Mind may be affected, especially if the interpreter has difficulty representing register shifts or indicating who is speaking. Without this information, the child has limited data to build an understanding of how other people’s minds work or of personal tendencies in teachers and classmates. A child who can access conversations with peers only by using an interpreter may have reduced opportunities to engage in authentic, rich discussions and debate with peers. These kinds of experiences are essential for cognitive development for any child or youth. Also, deaf or hard of hearing children may have difficulty developing close friendships with their hearing classmates, which also can affect the quality of discussions and, ultimately, learning. These potential differences in learning may occur even when the interpreter is highly skilled, which we know is typically not the situation in educational interpreting.
When the interpreter is unable to provide the child access to the classroom content, the information the child receives may distort, negate, or even change concepts. Then the child is faced with the task of trying to determine the real information or concept, which requires a great deal more metacognitive processing than is required by his or her hearing peers.
How can a school ensure classroom access for students who are deaf or hard of hearing? First, recognize that providing access to an educational program means more than providing an interpreter. The educational interpreter cannot make this complex integration happen without help from the deaf educator and the regular classroom teacher. Educational interpreters do not have the training to conduct the kinds of assessments that are necessary to determine the success of the placement. However, educational interpreters can provide critical observations about the student. Each member of the educational team contributes a unique perspective and expertise. Of course, the educational interpreter should also be trained to be a true member of the educational team, which requires knowing more about the learning process than how to interpret. Providing access also involves schools ensuring that the regular classroom teacher strives to make the deaf or hard of hearing student an active participant. It is difficult for an interpreter to “fix” a classroom where the teacher does not have a connection with the deaf or hard of hearing student. The regular classroom teacher should also receive information about what kinds of learning are difficult when a child is using an interpreter.
Second, the educational team should focus on the extent to which the student who is deaf or hard of hearing is truly integrated into the classroom and is learning. The team should base their judgments of the success of this placement on real observations and assessments of learning. Collaborating with the interpreter as a team member, the team should discuss how much the student is included in class participation, how much the student is a respected team member in group projects, and how much the student seems connected with the cognitive life of the classroom. The team should gather evidence of learning. Research shows that children have more difficulty learning with an interpreter than from a teacher who signs, even when the interpreter is highly skilled (Kurz 2004). If a student is having difficulty learning basic facts and concepts using an interpreter, then likely, many aspects of classroom discourse are also not being learned.
Third, all educational interpreters must be qualified to provide access according to external standards. Schools should employ only interpreters who have skills that meet some external standard (e.g., EIPA > 4.0 or RID-certified). A deaf or hard of hearing student’s learning challenge is formidable, even with a highly qualified interpreter. In addition, when a deaf or hard of hearing student is not making adequate progress, schools should not assume that the student is the source of the problem. Schools should also consider that the student may not have sufficient access to the classroom content because of the interpreter’s limited qualifications.
In summary, many aspects of classroom discourse are essential for children to learn. We should look beyond the provided services of a qualified interpreter to consider how well a student can learn and participate in a particular educational setting. In addition, because peer and friend relationships, class participation, and engagement in learning is essential for all students, we should focus on these elements when assessing the success of an interpreted education placement. Schools need to ensure that students who learn through educational interpreters are active participants in the cognitive life of the classroom. Ensuring this participation is not the educational interpreter’s responsibility; rather, all members of the educational team should work to make this engagement happen. Anything less compromises learning and cognitive development, essential goals of education.
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